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Trust and Hope

An Introduction

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Anthropology has a history of sometimes troubled relations with neighboring disciplines, yet at the same time there have been major efforts both within anthropology and within various related disciplines for cross-fertilization and for advancing interdisciplinary work. Anthropology has been cited as a source of inspiration for new perspectives and new scholarly developments by scholars in history, literary criticism, sociology, political science, economics, demography, gerontology, legal studies, education, women's studies, art history, music, and other fields. This series addresses the need for works that examine the intersection of anthropology and these other academic fields.

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Edited by Sune Lüsberg, Esther Oluffa Pedersen, and Anne Line Dalsgård

ANTHROPOLOGY & PHILOSOPHY

Dialogues on Trust and Hope

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INTRODUCTION

Trust and Hope

Esther Oluffa Pedersen and Sune Liisberg

Trusting and hoping alike are conjectural modes of understanding. They relate to the practical identity of human beings as persons. Who can I trust? What may I hope? Although both trust and hope are related to factual understandings of past experiences, they equally imply a move toward the future that depends on the imaginary anticipation of the imminent. They concern future states that exceed the immediate control of the person trusting or hoping. But whereas trust typically concerns near and probable futures that mostly meet our expectations, hope may very well paint a scenario of a possible and radically different future. Hope in the radically new is a mode of existence that can persist without trust in its realization. But if I hope for events and phenomena that lie closer to my immediate life-world, my hope seems to be backed up by some kind of trust in these things being possible to realize. Trusting someone or something implies that I also hope for the realization of the trusted. My hope, however, can be completely convoluted and implicit in trust in a way that makes a re-description of trust in terms of hope misleading. In this sense, trusting is a mode of existence that shapes our outlook on the near future; a future that will probably develop according to implicitly or explicitly expressed expectations. Hope, conversely, is a perspective toward a future that I wish were possible, but about which I may also have a troublesome feeling that it may not be realized. This difference in the subjunctive space taken up by trust and hope, respectively, is important and constitutes the basis for a difference in the approaches taken when researching trust and hope.

There is a significant and increasing interest in studying trust, whereas hope as a research topic is not favored with the same attention. A prevalent approach to studying trust in the social sciences is to perform quantitative survey studies of generalized trust in different entities, ranging from trust in political institutions, over trust in the economy, to trust in other individuals. On the background of large-scale, quantitative survey studies into trust, social scientists talk about low-trust and high-trust nations and communities. Such measurements of trust are common, and the results are often mentioned in the public debate. But when it comes to hope, we do not find a similar level of attention. There are examples of quantitative measurements of hope, but they are rare. The difference surely has something to do with the fact that while high/low degrees of trust indicate traits about the general behavior of the members of a given group, this would not be as apparent with measurements of hope. There seems to be a fairly robust correlation between measuring high degrees of trust in a population and high levels of social collaboration. Similar correlations between hope and behavior are much looser—if, indeed, they can be tracked at all. Basically, hope does not lend itself as easily to quantitative measurement as trust does.

In the context of this book there will be little focus on quantitative approaches to the study of trust and hope. In its place the reader will find conceptual and qualitative analyses of trust and hope, viewed from within a specific context and as a phenomenon pertaining to the first-person perspective, which takes a central position in the chapters that make up this volume. The common foundation for all of the chapters is the double approach of, firstly, developing a mode of collaboration between anthropology and philosophy and, secondly, analyzing either trust or hope from the viewpoint of the association between the specific anthropologist and philosopher. Accordingly, all chapters are the result of collaboration between an anthropologist and a philosopher, who have discussed a common angle and a shared interest in trust and hope. Some of the contributing anthropologists and philosophers take their point of departure in developing or sustaining a distinctive theoretical understanding of trust and hope. Others seek to understand a specific cultural context through the perspective of either trust or hope, while yet others engage in developing empirical and conceptual bridges between trust and hope.

The participating anthropologists and philosophers, working in pairs, have discussed and developed their specialized academic research angles, focusing their encounters on a shared topic. In so doing, this anthology goes against the current, that is, it counteracts the scarcity of direct di-

dialogue between the two disciplines. Presupposing and aiming to show that a huge potential exists and can be uncovered by jointly exploring these topics, the anthology seeks to pave the way for further collaborative efforts by bringing anthropologists and philosophers together in the shared exploration of trust and hope. The underlying premise of the book is that the phenomena of trust and hope can best be examined and analyzed when standing upon a strong empirical foundation and reaching outward to perform an equally strong conceptual exploration. The dialogues collected in this anthology seek to substantially develop the current understanding of trust and hope in anthropological and philosophical research. We hope that the different models of cooperation between anthropologists and philosophers represented here may inspire other anthropologists and philosophers to engage in interdisciplinary projects, discussions, and work. In this sense, we consider the very format of the book to be paradigmatic and encouraging for new possibilities of interdisciplinary research into the human condition.

The Context for Bringing Anthropologists and Philosophers into Dialogue

The conception of this anthology dates back to 2009, a period of time at Aarhus University where anthropologists and philosophers from Denmark and the United States had the opportunity to do interdisciplinary work and exchange their views. Anthropologists and philosophers alike experienced their exchange of ideas as being so productive that it was suggested that we should build on this creative moment to shape something more enduring. Thus, the idea behind the anthology was born. Contributors were soon invited, and work began. As with most anthologies, the process of actualizing the content has, at times, been challenging. Some of these challenges were purely practical, while others had to do with the form that we had chosen for the book: The contributions should, in one form or another, be a dialogue between an anthropologist and a philosopher. We had no recipe for this kind of partnership, so every pair of contributors had to find their own way of doing it. We have found these challenges worthwhile and valuable because the results of the encounters between representatives of anthropology and philosophy demonstrate how both disciplines can benefit from such interdisciplinary work.

Within a Danish context, trust and hope have a prominent history as privileged topics of research. It is almost impossible to discuss trust without mentioning the Danish philosopher and theologian Knud Ejler

Løgstrup (1905–1981), a former professor at Aarhus University. His book *The Ethical Demand* (Løgstrup [1956] 1997), has had a lasting significance for the understanding and discussion of the phenomenon of trust. According to Løgstrup, trust is naturally given. Our immediate and unbiased reaction to another human being is characterized by trust. Trust is thus the original moral sentiment that forms human encounters. Only subsequently do we pass judgment on one another, and only subsequently are we in need of moral principles to guide our actions. Løgstrup argues that the human life-world is permeated with the silent, radical, and unarticulated ethical demand that we take care of the exposed, vulnerable life placed into our hands by another person, “the other.” Building on this premise, Løgstrup launches a critique not only of traditional moral theories such as Immanuel Kant’s (1724–1804) conception of the categorical imperative based on reason to guide and motivate moral actions, or utilitarianism’s conception of morality as the principle of the greatest happiness, but also what Løgstrup (1968) refers to as the “subjectivism” of the Danish philosopher and theologian Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855).

Løgstrup finds that Kierkegaard has misrepresented not only the relations between human beings, but also the human relation to the world and God. We are, according to Løgstrup, placed in a shared life-world, which is imbued with the responsibility to safeguard the fragility of life. Løgstrup focuses on the permeating goodness of Creation, arguing that we are all placed in this world with a mutual responsibility to sustain it. For his part, Kierkegaard understood human life as radically individual, in that a true relation to God is characterized by passion and can be established only from the point of view of subjectivity. Where Løgstrup concentrates on trust as a phenomenon closely related to everyday life, Kierkegaard examines the everyday despair of the human being. In Kierkegaard’s view, despair is only dissolvable by the Christian possibility of faith. A key assumption in Kierkegaard is therefore the assertion that life would be nothing but despair, were there no eternal consciousness (Kierkegaard [1843] 1983), and this assertion is important to Kierkegaard’s notion of futurity and the possibility of hope.

In his famous analysis of anxiety from 1843, Kierkegaard (1992) defines anxiety as a dizzy experience of freedom that confronts us with possibility as such, and possibility is linked with futurity, since having existential possibility is defining for having a future. In this radical experience of freedom, the human being is confronted with the idea of God as representing a person’s possibility of being forgiven and, at the same time, as the limit of reason to which the human subject can relate only in faith. According to Kierkegaard ([1843] 1990), faith is concerned

with eternity in the form of being an expectation of victory. However, the victory of faith simply consists in *having* the expectation now, in *this* concrete life—existentially it does not concern a victory in another, distant life. Faith, being the expectation of victory, in this way entails hope as a modus of human life as well. So, in Kierkegaard, one could say that from the depths of anxiety and despair we are thrown back into the life that we have before us, our own life, but in a qualitatively different way, namely as something that is subjected to a choice, and which can exclusively be realized authentically as chosen. Only against this background—and this would be the existentialist argument against Løgstrup—can trust and hope as everyday features of the human social world qualify as features of what we have chosen more fundamentally, namely our life.

In the present volume, several contributors, American and Danish, critically discuss Løgstrup's theory of trust. Kierkegaard, among other existentialist and existential-political thinkers, is also addressed here by some as a central thinker, especially with regard to the theme of hope. From another angle, namely the French sociological tradition, comes a figure that is central for a number of contributors: the anthropologist Marcel Mauss. His widely acknowledged book *The Gift* from 1925 (Mauss 2010) seems to capture a very essential feature of trust relations: the structure of gift exchange. The exchange of gifts is what Mauss has called "a total social phenomenon," meaning that it lies at the root of, and is implied in, every social enterprise and comes across as a more basic structure of sociality than the *homo oeconomicus* of our days; and so it is that Mauss suggests that we should take as a principal aspect of our life what has been, and always will be, the principle: Go beyond yourself, donate, freely and obligatorily; one has nothing there to risk (see Mauss [1925] 2010). In its capacity of being a total social phenomenon, the structure of gift exchange might as well be identified as lying at the root of inter-human trust relations. One could say that when people trust one another, we actually exchange a piece of our freedom with the other person.

The above-mentioned authors do not exhaust the theoretical sources of inspiration for investigations of trust and hope in the area where anthropology and philosophy intersect. The dialogues presented in this anthology are a vivid illustration of this. Nevertheless, by pointing to a discrepancy between Løgstrup's propensity to hold an affirmative and optimistic worldview, on the one hand, and Kierkegaard's more gloomy and individualistic stance to the world, on the other hand, we can indicate a larger question concerning how to approach the phenomena of trust and hope that needs to be dealt with in one way or another.

That question is: Will we take as our starting point an affirmation of the actuality and relevance of trust and hope, or will we commence to question what trust and hope may be within the modern world? The dialogues in this volume present different answers. The theoretical framework of gift-giving elaborated on by Mauss offers a possible way to obviate the choice itself (between a tendency to hold generally optimistic or pessimistic views concerning the instantiation of investigations into trust and hope) by focusing on the structure of giving and receiving gifts. The French tradition of Mauss thereby gives primacy to an analysis of the structure, preferring it over an investigation into the individual perspective. As regards a discussion of agent versus structure, the dialogues in this volume once again present a variety of different takes on how to tackle such methodological issues.

The Results of the Meetings Between Anthropologists and Philosophers in Their Writing

Commencing on a joint endeavor between anthropologists and philosophers is only possible when the partners from the two disciplines are open toward the way questions are asked and answers are sought by the anthropologist and the philosopher respectively. Thus the discussion of possibilities of collaboration should not be conducted on a too abstract level. It needs to be grounded in either an approach to practicing anthropological and philosophical analysis or in a specific topic. The seven pairs presented here can be said to develop seven distinct approaches to the joint venture of anthropologists and philosophers. The different modes of collaboration will hopefully be interesting for others to read both because of their different ways of handling the interdisciplinary work and because of the analyses that arise out of the experiment.

The opening dialogue, *Practical Philosophy and Hope as a Moral Project among African-Americans*, between anthropologist Cheryl Mattingly and philosopher Uffe Juul Jensen, reflects upon the relations between anthropology and philosophy. It argues for the rewards of this encounter, and shows how a fruitful encounter can take place by elaborating on the fieldwork done by Mattingly. They have approvingly taken on the recommendation of interdisciplinary work between anthropologists and philosophers and have composed a jointly authored chapter, "What Can We Hope For? An Exploration in Cosmopolitan Philosophical Anthropology." The text is structured around two parts in which Mattingly and Jensen first discuss how collaboration between anthropologists and philosophers may develop and enhance both if it rests on

a mutual recognition of the insights of each discipline. The authors note that both disciplines seem to keep a distance to each other. But instead of lamenting the lack of collaboration in spite of the many shared interest in subject matter, they propose a way of initiating the conversation between anthropology and philosophy that begins in philosophy, but should be equally important for anthropology. Firstly, going back to Aristotle, they point out how philosophy, in order to philosophize about the world, needs to go beyond itself and look to other disciplines that produce valuable knowledge. Secondly, they invoke Sartre, who emphasized that philosophizing in the armchair and doing exegesis of texts is not enough if one really wants to philosophize about important matters. One needs to pay attention to the social practices themselves, and one must also be changed personally by the practice of philosophizing. In other words, the development of social theory—whether it be philosophical or anthropological—demands engagement with social world practices. Learning and understanding the “real” social world entails a change of personality in the sense of a change of perspective and a deepening of one’s understanding that does not leave everything as it was. Jensen and Mattingly thirdly argue that recapturing the distinction between “exegetical” and “cosmopolitan” forms of philosophy, the distinction which Kant drew, makes it possible to retain a space for the important practice of exegesis within philosophy without discrediting one’s involvement in theorizing about worldly affairs. The philosophical anthropology of Kant is devoted to investigating popular concepts used by ordinary language users, and, in this sense, it covers Kant’s idea of a cosmopolitan philosophy as well as the discipline of contemporary anthropology. Although neither Jensen nor Mattingly are prone to accept Kantian philosophy as methodologically contemporary, they argue that his idea of a cosmopolitan philosophical anthropology makes a convincing starting point for fruitful encounters between the modern disciplines of anthropology and philosophy.

The second part of the joint chapter is an exposition of how a cosmopolitan philosophical anthropology might look. Focusing on the ethnographic material from the fieldwork done by Mattingly and her group in Los Angeles among African-American families caring for children with severe medical conditions, the authors develop a study of hope. The concept of hope concerns future time in the subjunctive mode, and it can only be understood by taking the first-person perspective of the person(s) hoping for the future. To study the concept of hope goes against one of the major trends in current anthropology and current philosophy, namely the structuralist and poststructuralist frameworks that downplay personhood. Jensen and Mattingly show—making a di-

rect reference to Sartre's claim that we ought not to employ theoretical positions without acknowledging how these theories develop as reactions to other paradigms and positions—how this interest in hope intersects with contemporary social theory. They develop a variant of virtue ethics rooted in Aristotle, but in employing it they stress that the perspective of hope only emerges if we look at the processes of acting and becoming as ends in themselves. Subsequently, the authors examine a concrete ethnographic instance of the process of becoming hopeful in spite of profound despair.

The dialogue *Existential Anthropology and the Category of the New*—between anthropologist Michael D. Jackson, author of the chapter “The Reopening of the Gate of Effort: Existential Imperatives at the Margins of a Globalized World,” and philosopher Thomas S. Wentzer, author of the chapter “The Eternal Recurrence of the New”—explores the question of an existential imperative concerning the desire to live a rich and fulfilled life. Jackson, drawing upon the material from his fieldwork in Kuranko villages in Northern Sierra Leone, focuses on the equivocality that pertains to our wishes for a better future. We address the powers that be *both* in the hope that some good will come of it *and* in the knowledge that our petitions will probably come to nothing. This realistic knowledge is attenuated under the conditions of life as it is lived by people on the margins of the globalized world, such as the Kuranko people. But it is, according to Jackson, an existential experience pertaining to human life as such, since it concerns the distribution and redistribution of the scarcest of all goods: life itself. We aim for a life of well-being, but this is never a settled state. It is an ongoing struggle. Humans hardly ever feel completely satisfied with their lot, which is why they almost always strive to improve their situation socially, spiritually, or materially. This feeling of want, in proportion to what we think life ought to yield to us, is what Jackson calls “existential dissatisfaction” and it is an irreducible part of the human condition.

Jackson invokes two significant episodes from his recent fieldwork in Kuranko. First there is the letter from Ferenkay, a young Kuranko man from the village of Firawa, urging the recipient of the letter to take him along and give him a job and enable him to work. On the one hand this letter raises the ethical issue of why some people have so much more than others, and on the other hand it appeals to a conception of natural justice whereby all human beings are entitled to partake of the good things in life. Ferenkay appeals to “Mr. White Man” as a power mighty enough to be able to create a radical change and a new and better beginning for his life. This letter, along with the second episode, a direct appeal that Jackson gets from another young man, Fasili, to take

Fasili with him to America, depict very clearly the dilemma that Jackson, as a comparatively rich person, experiences when confronted with the existential demand from another person to assure him a fair deal, or some kind of natural justice. For how can one help the other in need without leaving oneself destitute? Fasili embodies the equivocality of the existential demand in his simultaneous patient stoicism toward the desperate conditions of his life, and his impatient and urgent desire for transformation of his situation. It is precisely this duality of hope toward the future that Wentzer's contribution subjects to a conceptual analysis. Wentzer relates his philosophical analysis of the new to the concrete fieldwork of Jackson.

Arguing for an existential understanding of the new, Wentzer underscores that the predicate "new" or the ontology of change concerns our emotive and conceptual stances toward our lives, which are brought into play while we cope with a changing world. According to Wentzer, we only articulate novelty if it comes across as the opening of an opportunity for us, while we resign and suffer the occurrences of the world whenever they work against us. To underline this existential attitude toward the new the ideal type attitudes of the stoicism of Seneca, and the historicism of Hegel are invoked. Thus Wentzer argues that the language of the new is solely employed when we want to understand the future and our life as our own doing. Wentzer interprets the right to experience the event of a new beginning in one's life as an existential demand in human life. This demand represents an imaginative doorway to a new lifetime—we hope for a new beginning and thus hope for the possibility of doing things differently. It is therefore an optimistic hope to get a grip on one's own life, felt from the first-person perspective. This hope, however, may—if realized—turn out disappointing. It is not given that a new beginning—even such a radical one as Fasili dreams of by asking Jackson to bring him to America—will bring about a better life-situation. It may turn out to be another experience of suppression and structural violence. According to Wentzer, the new should be understood as an attitude toward one's future lifetime rather than an actual event. The new is real only as a mode of experiencing significant possible change in life. It is, as such, an integral part of the human condition as an intentional stance toward the occurrences in one's life.

Wentzer and Jackson join forces to develop and explore the possibilities of an existential anthropology that focuses on the common human condition and the shared wish to live in the world as if it were one's own. The existential attitudes toward life and the narrating effort to understand life both as stoic fate and as possible new and better beginnings where we are subjects of our lives, instead of subjected to the

happenings of life, the authors argue, ought not to be reified as different social formations or different forms of humanity.

Philosopher Esther Oluffa Pedersen and anthropologist Lotte Meinert anchor their dialogue *Intentional Trust in Uganda* in a common interest in understanding the attitudes of trust and distrust as these are formed in, and of, the social sphere of human life. Through discussions during the writing process the two authors have taken mutual inspiration from each other. Their chapters are the result of a coordination and cooperation between two independent lines of research. Pedersen's chapter, entitled "An Outline of Interpersonal Trust and Distrust," develops a conceptual framework for understanding trust and distrust as attitudes that are highly sensitive to the social environment of the individual. Meinert's chapter, "Tricky Trust: Distrust as a Point of Departure and Trust as a Social Achievement in Uganda," is based on ethnographic fieldwork carried out in Uganda primarily since 2008—which was the year when "peace broke out," as the Ugandans in the northern part of the country jokingly call the general peace treaty in Uganda. Pedersen and Meinert have worked at corroborating the theoretical model of trust suggested by Pedersen with the insights from the fieldwork conducted by Meinert. As a result of the discussions they have developed a common understanding of both Pedersen's theoretical framework and Meinert's interpretation of her own fieldwork. In her theoretical conception of interpersonal trust, Pedersen strives to develop a framework within which both the individual experience of developments and changes in trust relationships between persons, and the general and more broad sociological atmosphere of trust or distrust between peers is taken into account. In order to achieve this goal she develops three main concepts. The first concept is "prima facie trust/distrust" by which Pedersen denotes the immediate way in which a person tends to meet social situations, trustfully or distrustfully, on the background of "things taken for granted" by that person. Important to Pedersen's notion of prima facie trust/distrust is—in opposition to Knud E. Løgstrup—that it does not imply the assumption of an ontological or moral hierarchy between the attitudes of either trust or distrust. Rather, whether a person as a default attitude meets others with trust or distrust depends on her past experience and social environment—brought up in an atmosphere of distrust between peers, distrust will also become the prima facie attitude in encounters with others. Pedersen's second main concept, "reflective trust/distrust," covers situations in which a person's social world of "things-taken-for-granted" erodes and a decision about whether to act trustfully or distrustfully is required. Here, the situation and the comprehension hereof by the person experi-

encing it will force a reflective consideration of whether displaying trust or distrust toward others is appropriate. Thus in experiencing a breach in the expectancies the person is forced to reflect over her placement of either trust or distrust in others and under certain circumstances. While the first two concepts are meant to apply from a first-person perspective, the third concept of Pedersen's conceptual framework, the "locus of trust," only applies from a third-person perspective and involves a description of the trust situation and the place of the trust relationship. This concept in particular has been developed through the discussions between Meinert and Pedersen. The idea is to try to capture the whole scene of trustful and distrustful interactions by schematizing features of each interacting individual with respect to questions about conventions of social action, institutions and social structure, collective worldviews, and ways of behaving toward nature and social entities. Thus, the locus of trust is "the interface of all participating agents' individual trust diagrams in concrete time and place."

Meinert opens her chapter by critically discussing the Danish theologian K. E. Løgstrup's assumption that trust is an ontologically (or naturally) founded and therefore basic attitude of human interaction, whereas distrust simply denotes a lack of trust. Meinert's ethnographic fieldwork in Uganda suggests, in contradiction to Løgstrup, that developing trust is a vulnerable and tricky human enterprise that may be preconditioned by distrust. In fieldwork observations in Uganda, Meinert argues that the atmosphere of trust is permeated by distrust so that the human social world is, at the outset, taken to *be* untrustworthy. The trust in one another has no ontological status but is something we continually have to establish, to will into existence, and to fight for. During the period of 2008 to 2011, Meinert has conducted interviews with two young Ugandan men, Peter and Oloya, who were both, in different ways, victims of the long-lasting armed conflict between the rebel Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Ugandan government. In 2008, after several years of unsuccessful peace negotiations, an agreement to cease hostilities was finally signed between the conflicting parties. At that time the conflict had lasted for twenty-two years, and it left behind a Ugandan people who were deeply divided and beset with new uncertainties. This is the situation in which Meinert, in a local video shop, and over a period of three years, meets with Peter and Oloya, who both make music to express their state of uncertainty and despair, but also their hopes for a better future characterized by trust and truthfulness. In her interpretations and conclusions Meinert draws on the texts that accompany Peter's and Oloya's music, and also on their life stories as told to her by them, gradually revealing a deep rooted and all-

embracing distrust. This finally leads Meinert to suggest that we cannot take trust to be the ontologically basic feature of inter-human relations as suggested in Løgstrup's theory of trust.

As for the dialogue between the two chapters, Pedersen incorporates Meinert's cases as striking examples that illustrate the difference between the levels of *prima facie* and reflective trust/distrust. Likewise, Meinert applies the conceptual framework of Pedersen's chapter in order to grasp the differences between, on the one hand, the *prima facie* distrust that characterize the two young men and, on the other hand, their quest for a better future, which comes to the fore in their music. In their music, the young men reflectively strive after developing trust. This Meinert views as an example of Pedersen's differentiation between a *prima facie* attitude of distrust and a reflective strive to build up trusting attitudes toward others.

Whereas Meinert's fieldwork in Uganda draws attention to a social environment where distrust is predominant, anthropologist Nils Bubandt's fieldwork in Indonesia points to another complicated feature of trust relationships, namely the interconnections between trust, inauthenticity, and power. In the dialogue *Trust, Ambiguity, and Indonesian Modernity*, Bubandt and philosopher Sune Liisberg explore the question whether inauthenticity and self-deception may be contained within trusting relationships. The cooperation in this dialogue consists of complementary investigations based on Bubandt's analyses of fieldwork material from Indonesia and Liisberg's philosophical analyses of the relation between trusting behavior and tolerance of ambiguity. Even though their chapters do not draw common conclusions, the shared effort to take the endeavor of the other into account opens the perspectives of anthropologists and philosophers to complementary readings. Throughout their chapters, Bubandt and Liisberg make meta-commentaries to each other that are meant to invite the reader also to engage in such meta-discussions of fruitful pathways between anthropology and philosophy. It is made clear that Liisberg's interpretation of trust as linked to tolerance of ambiguity through a benign form of self-deception and Bubandt's discussion of the complex intertwinement between trust, authenticity, inauthenticity, power, and forgery in Indonesia may be read together in a manner that enhances both.

In his chapter, "Trust in an Age of Inauthenticity: Power and Indonesian Modernity," Bubandt presents his fieldwork from Indonesia as what he calls a "counter-ethnography," which serves to point out that the accustomed Western story of universal structures of trust and authenticity in modernity are far more complex. Bubandt endorses an idea of multiple modernities to elucidate the circumstances pertaining

to Indonesian understandings of power and authenticity. The aporia of Indonesian conceptions of power, trust, and novelty is that the new is politically claimed to be authentic by virtue of power, but that power is inherently inauthentic. Bubandt illustrates his assumption by discussions of, firstly, the theme park *Taman Mini Indonesia Indah*, where the political power of the “New Order” of president Suharto installed itself as the authentic source of interpretation—and construction—of Indonesian culture. Secondly, Bubandt invokes the example of forgery to discuss the role played by *aspal*, or “authentic-fake,” products in Indonesian ordinary, fiscal, and political life. Bubandt accounts for the lethal role played by a fake letter in the riots and unrest between Muslims and Christians in North Maluku in 2001. The letter, although suspected of being a forgery, still had a social effect. It reverses the logic of the “authentic-fake” state; a state that bestows authenticity upon objects simply by fiat and through its actual power. As a result, in Indonesia one can trust the givenness of power even while, at the same time, claims as to the authenticity of power and its authoritative signs are entirely untrustworthy.

Liisberg, in his chapter, “Trust as the Life Magic of Self-Deception: A Philosophical-Psychological Investigation into Tolerance of Ambiguity,” embarks on a methodologically very different route by conferring his energy into an interpretation of Jean-Paul Sartre as a philosopher of trust. Liisberg shows how Sartre’s concepts of good and bad faith equally are instances of self-deception. Within the core of trustfulness there lies a certain type of self-deception in the form of good faith. It concerns a positive illusion about the other, which is needed to be able to trust in spite of an uncertainty, at least principal, about the intentions of the other—as they are merely probable—and about the future. This positive illusion can, according to Liisberg, be understood as a way of tolerating ambiguity. Since the happenings of the world are never known beforehand, the future is exposed to uncertainty. Trusting others in good faith is consequently something we can do when the ambiguities of the world stay on the fringes of our consciousness, while distrusting behavior potentially arises from an acute awareness of these ambiguities. The recourse to self-deception as bad faith is an attempt to overcome the meta-stable structure of human existence, namely the way our existence is stretched out between a facticity and a transcendence of the given. In bad faith we either reify our transcendence by identifying with our facticity in a role—Sartre’s famous example being the waiter, who believes himself to be essentially a waiter in an attempt to escape his inevitable freedom—or we endeavor to understand ourselves as pure consciousness or pure transcendence—where Sartre

offers the example of a woman who denies the fact that she is on an obviously romantic date with a man by insisting that the man is entirely interested in having an intellectual conversation with her. The essential point that Liisberg makes is that we ought to employ the differentiation between good and bad faith not as a differentiation between authentic and inauthentic beliefs, but rather between self-deceptive ways in which we try to cope with the inherent ambiguities of life, whereby trust can be interpreted as a certain benign form of self-deception based on positive ideas about the other.

Bubandt and Liisberg find throughout their meta-discussions of the work of the other fruitful ways of including the concepts and phenomena of each other. Different from such a model of cooperation, the dialogue between philosopher Sverre Raffnsøe and anthropologist Hirokazu Miyazaki is molded as Miyazaki's response to Raffnsøe's concepts and ideas. As the title, *Gift-Giving and Power Between Trust and Hope*, suggests, Raffnsøe and Miyazaki investigate the relations between trust and hope through the lens of gift-giving and the social power it entails. Miyazaki's contribution, "Hope in the Gift—Hope in Sleep" is partly based on ethnographical fieldwork done in Fiji. It takes the form of a comment to Raffnsøe's chapter, "Empowering Trust in the New: Trust and Power as Capacities." Raffnsøe's aim is to develop a new conception of power—which he calls "Power II"—a conception that enables us to consider trust as something which involves power, and vice versa, especially in the context of management. Without power there can be no management. The question is, however, whether the classical understanding of power, which consist in an "either-or" model—either you are in power and do not trust, or you trust at the price of having power—can serve as a model in a time like ours, where management tends to become management of self-management. Raffnsøe's suggestion is that management needs to adopt an idea of "both-and," since in practical terms management needs both power and trust in order to function. If we want to place our "trust in trust" within management, we need to know how trust and power are internally compatible with each other. In opposition to the classical notion of power, which can also be defined by "the four Cs" (command, coercion, control, and calculation), the more refined concept of power that Raffnsøe presents is defined as a capacity to affect "the dispositions and the conduct" of others, which leads us to focus on the virtual. This means that we can conceive of trust as an anticipatory affect: Instead of calculating and controlling future scenarios by means of command and coercion, we rely on trust as the means to "conduct the conduct of others" by affecting their dispositions *through* the trust we place in them. Against this

backdrop, trust becomes associated with hope and is turned toward the new as a form of negotiating the future, that is, as a form of the exchange of gifts, following Marcel Mauss's model of primitive societies.

In his comment on Raffnsøe's chapter, Miyazaki, on the basis of his fieldwork among indigenous Fijians, focuses on the gift as a model of trust. Gift-givers place trust in gift-receivers, and this is anchored in hope, namely the hope for the efficacy of the gift. Furthermore, to the Fijians the exchange of gifts is a means to obviate uncertainty, unknowability, and indeterminacy, which in addition generates hope for God's mercy—the gift of eternal life—and obviates the unknowability of the efficacy of the gift-giving itself. Thus, hope is allowed anew as a motivator of trust. As an alternative to understanding trust in terms of interaction, Miyazaki suggests the model of sleep as a non-interactional and non-relational model for comprehending the way trust and hope are constantly being made anew as capacities. If it is true that the gift is continual work, then sleep is an appropriate supplement to the gift. These considerations finally serve as a backdrop for Miyazaki's reflections upon the crisis of trust in Fukushima, which followed the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disasters that hit Japan in March 2011. As the Japanese government launched a campaign of *kizuna* (bonds) to unite forces throughout the nation to relieve the victims of the disasters, it was expecting a form of reciprocal trust, i.e. gift-giving between the government and the citizens. Miyazaki's analysis is concerned with the managerial motives of the "kizuna campaign" and the question why the campaign failed and instead engendered a sense of distrust in the government.

The dialogue *With Kierkegaard in Africa* is dedicated to a double investigation into hope as an existential structure in human life. Philosopher Anders Moe Rasmussen and anthropologist Hans Lucht take as their common starting point the perspective of the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard, and more specifically his book *Fear and Trembling* from 1843. Though Kierkegaard functions as a shared theoretical framework, Rasmussen and Lucht differ in the employment and analysis of Kierkegaard. Rasmussen is concerned with an interpretative elucidation of the existential structure of hope in Kierkegaard's text, whereas Lucht can be said to unfold the meaning of this structure in lived experience by invoking it in his analysis of fieldwork material. In this sense their chapters complement each other as two different types of readings of Kierkegaard and of the existential experience of hope. Thereby they also enhance the scope of Kierkegaard's philosophy.

Rasmussen opens his chapter, "Self, Hope, and the Unconditional: Kierkegaard on Faith and Hope," by noticing how a discourse of hope

seems to have regained standing in our political and social life—a notable example of this tendency being the 2008 Obama campaign in the United States. The concept of hope has traditional roots in religious discourse, where it denotes the hope of an afterlife. The modern condition, however, is one of secularization and breaking away from tradition. Therefore it becomes acutely relevant to ask whether the notion of hope is possible to keep up without any connotations of something that transcends, and hence is “not of this world.” According to Rasmussen, Kierkegaard is a most interesting witness to this question because he vividly invokes the two pitfalls in modernity, namely nihilism and orthodox religiosity/traditionalism. Confronted with the nihilistic nightmare that life is completely devoid of meaning, religious orthodoxy offers no remedy. Until Kierkegaard arrived on the scene, religious thought had managed to keep the nihilistic danger at a distance. But that path is no option for Kierkegaard. Instead, he attaches new meaning to the concepts of faith and hope, making them responsive to nihilism and turned against religious orthodoxy. Understood as a “paradox of existence,” faith is inscribed with a notion of distance or transcendence. This feature of faith Kierkegaard elucidates through what he calls the double movement of faith. The double movement consists in, firstly, a transcendence of the finite and thus a grasp of the infinite in the ethical stance. However, this infinite ethical security has to be transcended by the second movement leading to a return to the finite on the strength of the absurd. This double movement underscores that faith and hope are to be understood in terms of self-relation, or anthropologically. They denote the possibility of a radical change of attitude toward life as a whole; a change that accepts finitude only against the backdrop of the possible. Kierkegaard’s concept of hope is therefore an embracement of transitory reality as the place where something radically new can happen.

In the chapter “Kierkegaard in West Africa: Hope and Sacrifice in a Ghanaian Fishing Village,” Lucht employs the structure of hope as defined by Kierkegaard in the double movement of resigning everything and winning it back “on the strength of the absurd,” using it to elucidate the rationale behind anthropomorphisms. Responding by anthropomorphizing the world that one has been thrown into involves a re-figuration of that world to encompass moral concerns, so that the world can be trusted to respond to one’s yearnings and demands. Accordingly, human existence is based on the anguish involved in giving up everything to powers beyond one’s control in order to institute a moral structure on the indifferent outside world. Lucht interprets the struggles of Ghanaian fishermen in accordance with this structure of

hoping that the outside world will react responsively to their sacrifices. The canoe fishermen offer the sea not only the sacrifice of a bull, but also their unmitigated practical involvement in fishing, and they expect to get something in return from the sea's understanding that it is obliged to give them something back. In this sense, the traditional fishermen regard their toil with the sea and the fish as imbued with moral claims. However, the decline in canoe fishing in the coastal villages of Ghana compromises this worldview. Without any reason to believe that the sea, by yielding a catch, will restore the engagement of the fishermen, they fall into despair. The hopeless situation leaves many in a state of nihilism. One fisherman expresses this to the anthropologist as follows: "Come back in ten years, and you'll find nothing here." As an alternative, the hope of a better life in Europe spurs many to attempt high-risk immigration to Europe. The wave of African immigrants may be understood as gift-giving and sacrifice in a shape that poses a potential threat to the political systems of Europe, in the sense that willingness to give up everything may disturb that power structure because it cannot be reciprocated. If power is based on some kind of reciprocity, the underlying power structure cannot be upheld when gifts given to it consist in utter self-sacrifice. But Lucht remarks that for this to be the case, the risks taken by African immigrants would have to be interpreted as sacrifices, and this is far from the case. Rather, in Europe migrant stories are conveyed through a filter of distance that takes the deaths and the suffering of migrants crossing the Mediterranean sea out of their moral contexts and inscribes them in the happenings of the unresponsive world; a world to which Europeans seem to have no obligation.

Finally, in their epilogue "Anthropology and Philosophy in Dialogue?" anthropologist Anne Line Dalsgård and philosopher Søren Harnow Klausen discuss some of the complexities involved in the dialogue between philosophers and anthropologists, which both disciplines have only recently embarked upon, for instance in the present volume and a few other initiatives. Their chapter is therefore a meta-reflection upon, on the one hand, the biased presumptions of the two disciplines toward one another, and, on the other hand and in spite of these presumptions, the motivating factors in commencing such interdisciplinary engagement between philosophy and anthropology. Over the last two decades, philosophers have increasingly been finding that they ought to relate to, and maybe even integrate, empirical findings into their conceptually orientated work; in this respect, the philosopher's most obvious choice for an empirical research field has normally been the cognitive sciences. However, Klausen and Dalsgård argue, there are shortcomings linked with this combination, since most of the empirical findings in the

cognitive sciences have been the result of experimental, and so more or less de-contextualized, research settings. Here anthropology, based on ethnographical fieldwork, offers a quite different sort of research material for philosophers to dialogue with—if they dare—namely real-life research findings concerned with a salient topic, specifically the question: “What are human beings?” This question is also very central in philosophy, only in philosophy it is mostly posed in a generalizing form aiming at the essence of what *the* human being is. This difference therefore, and by the same token, invokes a classical example of how and where the two disciplines typically get into trouble when they confront each other, at least in the form of biases: On one side, anthropology, there is an emphasis on particular, contextualized points of view; on the other side, philosophy, there is an ambition of generalizing points of views into, ideally, an argument for one point of view. Nevertheless, anthropologists have always found inspiration in philosophy, and there are also examples of philosophers owing their inspiration to anthropology, one notable instance being the theoretical debt that French poststructuralism owes to structural anthropology. The ideal that Klausen and Dalsgård ultimately envision for the dialogue between anthropology and philosophy is that “philosophy could be prompted by the findings of anthropology to ask new questions, which would then be subjected to fieldwork by anthropologists.”

The present book is no ordinary anthology. It is a workroom in which anthropologists and philosophers have commenced on a dialogue on the two research topics, trust and hope, that are important for the field of anthropology as well as for the field of philosophy. The interdisciplinary efforts of the contributors demonstrate how the coming together of anthropologists and philosophers can result in new and challenging ways of thinking about trust and hope. We hope this endeavor of starting a closer dialogue between anthropology and philosophy will be a source of inspiration for others to work in the productive intersection between anthropology and philosophy and to investigate further into the social phenomena of trust and hope.

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